Not of Their Making
I recently responded to a question posted by the Washington Post’s “On Leadership” series regarding the airline executives symbolic flights to show that air travel was safe after the Icelandic volcano. There are several things to consider here.
Today’s executives are leading through considerable turbulence. For the airline industry, the on-going financial challenges alone are a perfect example. Now add to those long-standing burdens the situation in which thousands of planes were grounded as a result of volcanic activity. The result was lost revenue (to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars each day that flights were canceled), agitated passengers, and an operational nightmare. Who can prepare for a crisis like this?
Interestingly, a volcano eruption has interfered with air travel before so the situation is not a new one. Consequently, although one cannot predict a crisis like this, there is reason to believe leaders would have systems in place for dealing with an operational disruption of this sort, though perhaps not of this magnitude.
Perhaps a more compelling question is what should an effective leader do in the midst of a crisis? Several airline executives have taken test flights around the affected areas to demonstrate flight safety. The gesture I am sure was intended to be both symbolic and reinforcing, and symbolic activity is one important element of effective crisis handling. Stakeholders must perceive that leaders are doing all that they can, even if circumstances prohibit them from doing precisely what stakeholders necessarily want. Moreover, given that many passengers have been dissatisfied with flight travel and its cost and inconveniences in recent years, executives should do as much as they can to pacify this important stakeholder group.
What I am less convinced of, however, is whether the airline executives chose the right symbolic action. Sure, it was terrific news at the time that in some circumstances it was determined safe to fly. But how did that news help the stranded passengers whose flights were canceled in perpetuity because of industry regulations and backlogs? Were they getting to their destinations any sooner as a result of the executives having participated in test flights? If the symbolic action isn’t clearly linked to a defined outcome then it may perhaps frustrate stakeholders more than appease them. In this particular circumstance, my advice would have been to focus energy on those activities that would quickly get passengers moving. This might have meant spending additional time and resources on operational issues to facilitate travel once the flight ban was actually lifted.
Perhaps working in the airlines’ favor more than symbolism was the fact that the crisis was not necessarily one of their own making―which is different than the recent financial industry crisis, which was of their own making. In this case, the airlines cannot feasibly be blamed for the volcano’s eruption. Both research and conventional wisdom demonstrate that stakeholders have more empathy and patience for leaders under pressure when the crisis is a result of external circumstances. Yet, even this good will has its limits. If stakeholders come to eventually conclude that executives are inept at handling the situation, then the firm’s reputation will be severely damaged, and no symbolic action will help.